Bailbondsmen and the Fugitive Accused-The Need for Formal Removal Procedures by unknown
BAILBONDSMEN AND THE FUGITIVE ACCUSED-THE NEED
FOR FORMAL REMOVAL PROCEDURES
THE powers of the private bail bondsman to arrest and remove fugitive
criminals from one state to another seem anachronistic in the context of the
careful safeguards developed to protect the criminal accused in formal ex-
tradition procedure. A state, demanding return of an accused from another
state (the asylum state) is required to comply with formal remittance proce-
dures, sanctioned both by statute and by Constitution.- Demanding state officials
are powerless to arrest and transport an accused criminal apprehended in a
foreign jurisdiction from that jurisdiction to their own ;2 in requesting ex-
tradition, demanding states are required by the federal extradition act to com-
ply with certain formalities. 3 And under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act,4 currently in force in forty-four states, any accused arrested in an asylum
jurisdiction prior to requisition must be placed in custody of officials of that
jurisdiction, pending receipt of a demand in compliance with the federal and
state acts.' The accused must immediately be presented before a magistrate
1. See Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 41-42 (5th Cir. 1931).
2. SPEARs, T E LAw OF EXTRADITION 346-47 (1879); see generally Note, 61 YALE
L.J. 445 (1952).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958). The details of extradition procedure are governed by
both federal and state legislation. The federal statute was adopted by Congress in 1793
in order to implement the constitutional mandate that a "person charged in any state with
treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in, another state,
shall on, demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled be delivered
up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
The federal statute, which has remained substantially unchanged since its passage, pro-
vides that on proper demand it is the duty of the "executive authority" of the asylum
state to detain the accused, and turn him over to the agent of the executive authority of
the demanding state. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958). The demand must include a copy of an
indictment found or an affidavit made by a magistrate, and certified as authentic by the
governor of the demanding state, charging the defendant with a crime. The person de-
manded must be a "fugitive from justice," i.e., must have been, in the demanding state at
the time of the alleged crime, and must presently be sought to answer for the crime in
the courts of the demanding state. See Ex parte Riccardi, 68 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d 627
(1949).
4. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. [hereinafter cited as U.L.A.] 174 (1951).
Because the federal statute does not cover all the situations which may arise, it has
been acknowledged that the state may provide machinery for applying the law of extra-
dition in respect to matters not covered by Congress, including the method of arrest and
detention before extradition is demanded, the method of applying for a writ of habeas
corpus, the mode of preliminary trial and the manner of applying for a requisition. See
Commissioner's note to UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT 9 U.L.A. 171 (1951). A
considerable degree of uniformity in these particulars has been achieved through the wide-
spread adoption of the UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADrrION AcT. Besides the additions
mentioned above, the uniform statute reaffirms the federal requirements relating to the
form of the demand and makes explicit provision for the return of defendants who have
fled after conviction. UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT § 3.
5. See UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT §§ 10, 11, 13, 14. No doubt officers
from the demanding state qualify as "credible persons" or persons providing "reasonable
information" within the meaning of sections 13 and 14.
EXTRADITION BY BAILBONDSMEN
who must inform him of his right to retain counsel to assist him in contesting
the formal sufficiency of the demand. 6 Within a short time after commitment,
the demanding state must present a formal requisition to the asylum state,
or the accused may be released.7 To comply with the federal and state legis-
lation, this request must include sworn documents indicating, inter alia, that
the accused was in the demanding jurisdiction at the time the alleged crime
was committed,8 and that there is colorable proof that the accused had com-
mitted acts " which constitute crimes 10 under the laws of the demanding juris-
diction - acts for which he stands charged or convicted." The sufficiency of
6. Under § 10 of the UNIFORM AcT, the magistrate or judge is explicitly directed
to inform the accused of his right to procure legal counsel and to challenge his arrest
by seeking a writ of habeas corpus. But § 10 only covers accused persons who have been
arrested upon a rendition warrant issued by the governor of the asylum state. Where
the accused is arrested "on, the oath of any credible person" prior to issuance of such a
warrant, for detention pending receipt of a demand from the governor of the demand-
ing state, § 13 requires only that the accused first be brought before a judge or magis-
trate to "answer the charge" that he is an extraditable fugitive from justice.
7. See UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION Acr §§ 15, 17.
S. See UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADrrIoN AcT § 3; Huff v. Ayers, 6 N.J. Super. 380,
71 A.2d 392 (1950). Section 6 of the UNIFORM AcT permits exceptions in the unusual
case when acts committed in one state cause crimes in another state.
9. Section 3 of the UNIFORM AcT requires the demand for extradition be accom-
panied by:
:. . a copy of an indictment found or . . . [an] information supported by affidavit
in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made be-
fore a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued
thereupon; or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in
execution, thereof, together with a statement by the Executive Authority of the
demanding state that the person, claimed has escaped from confinement or has
broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole. The indictment, information, or
affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded
with having committed a crime under the laws of that state....
In United States v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1935), a leading case, the court,
on appeal from a habeas corpus proceeding, ordered that the fugitive, who had fled before
trial for murder, be discharged from the custody of the asylum state because a requisi-
tion issued by the demanding governor did not contain a copy of an indictment or a
certified affidavit upon which a finding of probable cause might be found. The affidavit
was defective because it mentioned facts which could have been, known only to an eye
witness, but included no statement by the affiant that she was, in fact, present, or that
she had reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged acts occurred. Again, in Henry
v. McArthur, 122 Colo. 474, 223 P.2d 621 (1950), the prisoner was discharged on the
ground that the information sent by the demanding governor was "only a verified accusa-
tion, by the prosecuting attorney, and is barren of any oath as to the matters contained
therein; neither . . . [did] it show any endorsement thereon of the names of the prose-
cuting witnesses." 122 Colo. at 477-78, 223 P.2d at 623. See also, e.g., In re Kjeldsen,
39 Misc. 2d 128, 240 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1963) ; In re Fritz, 137 N.J. Eq. 185, 44 A.2d 414
(1945).
10. See, e.g., Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va. 557, 29 S.E.2d 245 (1944) ; Ex parte Hub-
bard, 201 N.C. 472, 160 S.E. 569 (1931).
11. The exact charge against the defendant must be specified. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Ritholz v. Sain, 24 Il1. 2d 168, 180 N.E.2d 464 (1962). There the defendant was con-
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the demanding state's request is initially determined by the governor of the
asylum state, usually after a hearing.1 2 If the governor decides to extradite,
the accused has recourse to habeas corpus for judicial review of this deter-
mination ;13 this review has often led to denial of extradition because of some
flaw in the request from the demanding state.14 While it is true that an in-
determinate amount of official kidnapping occurs, 15 police compliance with
statutory procedures seems the normal course of behavior. 16
In contrast, the bondsman is largely immune from judicial control; his
power over an accused may exceed the power of the state. As a consequence,
he plays a singularly significant role in the pre-trial period. Clothed with the
powers of a peace officer armed with a warrant,17 the bondsman may seize the
accused in a foreign jurisdiction without the slightest compliance with extra-
dition requirements in the foreign jurisdiction.'8 The bondsman is often able,
victed, sentenced, and fined by a Michigan trial court for the crime of bribing public
officers. Conviction, and sentence were affirmed upon. appeal, but the defendant, who had
been released on bail pending outcome of the appeal, fled into Illinois, and subsequently
failed to surrender.
12. See Comment, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of Dis-
cretion, 66 YALE L.J. 97, 100-03 (1956). On, receipt of the demand, the governor of the
asylum state determines whether they conform to the requirements of the federal and
state statutes. If conformity is established, an, extradition warrant for the arrest of the
fugitive is issued. The accused has no legal right to an executive hearing, but upon timely
request most governors will grant an, executive hearing, and some do so as a matter of
course. Usually an administrative official, perhaps from the attorney general's office, pre-
sides over the hearing, in which the accused has the burden of contravening the allega-
tions of the requisition documents. The governor may grant or deny rendition upon re-
ceiving the hearing examiner's report. Exercise of the governor's discretion to refuse
rendition, is not subject to judicial review; his is a "moral duty," unenforceable by the
demanding state. The governor may refuse rendition on the grounds of, inter alia, formal
defects in- the requisition papers, failure to allege facts constituting a crime under the laws
of the demanding state, absence from the demanding state at the time that the crime was
committed, or absence of any factual substantiation of the charge. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Besides the cases cited in notes 19-22 supra, see, e.g., People ex rel. Fuller v.
Chaufty, 27 Misc. 2d 1074, 213 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1961); McGahagin v. State, 41 Ala. App.
236, 131 So. 2d 425 (1961) ; Ex parte Burns, 167 Tex. Crim. 533, 322 S.W.2d 289 (1959) ;
United States ex rel. Argento v. Jacobs, 176 F. Supp. 877 (N.D. Ohio 1959) ; Brown v.
Grimes, 214 Ga. 388, 104 S.E.2d 907 (1958); In re McMeans, 146 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio
Com. P1. 1957).
15. See Note, Illegal Abductions by State Police: Sanctions for Evasion of Extradi-
tion Statutes, 61 YALE L.J. 445, 448 (1952).
16. General compliance may be inferred from the rather sizeable volume of reported
litigation on technical points of extradition procedure. It is impossible to discern any signs
of judicial disillusion with the extradition laws arising from police circumvention.
17. See Ex parte Chance, 2 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Tex. 1933).
18. In re Von Der Ahe, 85 F. 959 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898). A citizen of Missouri
had returned there after jumping bail set in Pennsylvania, and had been forcibly brought
back to Pennsylvania by his bondsman, to satisfy a judgment entered against him for
malicious prosecution. The court recognized no difference between the power of bonds-
men in civil, as opposed to criminal actions and, in fact, purported to follow a leading
criminal case. The court distinguished between, the bondsman's power and that of a state
seeking extradition, as follows:
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as a matter of courtesy, to enlist the assistance of officials in the asylum state
in apprehending the accused or in keeping him in custody for a brief time
Of late years we have grown so accustomed to the proceedings by requisition that
we have come to regard it as the only means by which a person can be arrested
and moved from one state to another. An examination of the authorities, state and
federal, shows, however, that under certain circumstances, bail bondsmen have the
right to arrest their principals, wherever they find them, and remove them to the
forum from which they have been released ....
Id. at 960.
This doctrine was reiterated in Golla v. State, 50 Del. 497, 135 A.2d 137 (1957). There
the defendant had been released, after arrest in Delaware for assault, on $2500 bail.
While still on bail he went to Pennsylvania, where he was arrested by Pennsylvania au-
thorities for violation of a Pennsylvania parole, and was there jailed. Thereafter, two
Wilmington policemen, acting as agents for the Delaware bondsman, appeared at the
Pennsylvania prison and, with the Pennsylvania authorities' consent, and upon a showing
of a bail relation, took the prisoner into custody and returned him to Delaware. On
appeal from his Delaware conviction, the prisoner contended that he was improperly
brought to Delaware from Pennsylvania, since he neither waived extradition, nor was
any extradition sought by the state of Delaware. His appeal failed, the Delaware Supreme
Court holding that since the prisoner was taken into custody by agents of the bondsman,
acting under the authority of the bail piece, and not by an action of the state of Delaware,
no extradition was required. The court said:
In our opinion no extradition was necessary since the prisoner was taken into cus-
tody by the agents of his bondsman acting under the authority of a bail piece. It
seems to be well established that a bondsman seeking to deliver to custody the
person for whom he is responsible, and who has obtained a bail piece may pursue
the fugitive to any place within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, and
take him into custody.
50 Del. at 501, 135 A.2d at 139. The court further remarked that the defendant's conten-
tion was "wholly devoid of any merit and could have been disposed of summarily, in
order to demonstrate its lack of even a fairly debatable point of argument." Ibid. See
also United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559, 563, 565 (E.D. Ark. 1960) ; Fitzpatrick
v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931); Ex parte Chance, 2 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Tex.
1933) (dictum) ; Ex parte Salinger, 288 F. 752, 755 (2d Cir. 1923) (dictum) ; State v.
Lingerfelt, 109 N.C. 775, 14 S.E. 75 (1891) ; Note, 66 Dicx. L. REv. 101 (1961).
In the recent case of United States v. Trunko, .supra, Trunko, an employee of the
bonding company, was dispatched in pursuit.
He elected to make his arrest (in Ark.) in the hours of darkness. When the door
was opened to his knock, he burst his way into the presence of a law-abiding peace-
able old man. He rudely entered a bedroom occupied by a man, his wife, and baby,
flashing a light in the eyes of the sleeping object of his search . .. and placed [the
principal] under arrest, thereafter hastening from the house, placing him in an
automobile, and handcuffing him as though he were a dangerous criminal. After
so doing, the [bondsman] . . . drove away with [the principal, to Ohio] at a
terrific rate of speed, ignoring the pleas and protests of their prisoner's wife. All
of this was done to secure a remission of a $500 bond.
Id. at 565.
The United States sought, in an Arkansas District Court, a criminal conviction under a
federal civil rights statute [18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958)], alleging that Trunko, acting under
color of state law, had deprived the accused of his constitutional right to orderly transfer
between states under the federal extradition laws. Although the court in Trunko expressed
in general terms its disapproval of the pursuer's conduct (189 F. Supp. at 561, 564), it
stated that there would be nothing illegal in a private bondsman's utilization of such
methods of pursuit, capture and removal. Id. at 563, 565.
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before the bondsman takes him to the accusing jurisdiction.19 All the bonds-
man need do to obtain this assistance is to show asylum state officials docu-
mentary evidence of the existence of the bond relationship between himself
and the accused.20 This document, called a "bail piece" or "mittimus" order,
is obtained by the bondsman from an official, usually a judge,21 in the accus-
ing jurisdiction. Normally, it recites only the name of the accused, the formal
charge, the date at which the accused was to appear for trial, and the existence
of the bond relationship. 22 By establishing the bond relationship, the bail piece
enables the bondsman to reduce the principal to his custody at any time and
place during the relationship, and to return him forthwith to the court where
bail was given.23 No hearing need ever occur. Despite the apparent frequency
of interstate pursuit of criminals by bondsmen, the iniquities of an "extradit-
ing" bondsman rarely find their way into opinions. For one thing, it is well
established that illegal seizure to bring an accused within an accusing state
is no defense to that state's jurisdiction at a subsequent criminal trial ;24 an
accused wishing to challenge at trial the bondsman's action in removing him
from a foreign jurisdiction would at once be met with this doctrine. In addi-
tion, there appear to be few private law remedies for illegal removal. No
recent case has been reported in which a principal has sued, much less col-
lected a judgment, for false arrest or other tort recovery against "extraditing"
bondsmen or cooperating asylum state officials. 25 Finally, there is no practical
19. "It had been the original plan of . . . [the bondsman's agents] to lodge . . . [the
principal] in jail temporarily in Little Rock while they rested from their long drive from
Phoenix, Arizona, to Arkansas, and then to resume their trip." United States v. Trunko,
189 F. Supp. 559, 562 (1960). "He could have contacted the Sheriff of White County and
made his mission known and obtained assistance or support if he felt such to be neces-
sary." Id. at 565. Interviews with bondsmen and officials indicate that these practices are
widely carried on.
20. See United States v. Burl, 67 F. Supp. 583, 586 (E.D. Ill. 1946) ; RESTATEmIENT,
TORTS § 120(b), and comment. Compare It re Von Der Abe, 85 F. 959, 960 (C.C.W.D.
Pa. 1898) (". . . a bail piece is not the authority for the arrest, but is simply evidence
of the relation between the parties."), with Golla v. State, 135 A.2d 137, 139 (1957).
21. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 53 (1930); CONN. GENi. STAT. 52-319 (Supp.
1962). The latter statute is assumed to authorize issuance of a bail piece in the case of
actual as well as "intending" bail-jumpers.
22. See, e.g., mittimus used in Connecticut Circuit Courts, CCT 10 Rev. 7/61, cleg-
pub.
23. See note 29 supra.
24. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1951) ; Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
25. For a brief discussion of the doctrines which hinder tort recovery against officers,
see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1165 n.48 (1960). If convicted, the defendant may be in no position
to recover against either police or bondsman-:
[W]here conviction is followed by imprisonment, the chances that the potential
plaintiff will be able to prosecute his action are slim indeed. Even, if his conviction
does not destroy his right of action, the obstacles of prosecuting a civil suit from
a prison cell are almost insuperable, and the Supreme Court was probably wrong
when it assumed in Ker v. Illinois that the convicted and imprisoned defendant
could have his private action.
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access to courts in the asylum state; a bondsman apprehending an accused
in a foreign jurisdiction need not surrender him to the custody of an asylum
state. The general practice is that, even where asylum state officials cooperate
with the bondsman by keeping the accused in prison temporarily, the accused
is never presented before a magistrate.2 6 Thus, the accused is rarely given an
opportunity to secure legal counsel while he is temporarily detained in the
asylum state, and is rarely informed of his possible rights against removal to
another jurisdiction.
There is always the possibility that the bondsman can justify his
extraordinary powers by distinguishing state extradition proceedings on some
"policy" basis. Thus, it may be argued that the extradition laws are designed
solely to preserve harmony between asylum and demanding states, and that
the bail bondsman is a private agent whose activities can in no way constitute
a violation of the asylum state's sovereignty; the inconsistency would then
be defensible. Both strands of the argument are of questionable validity. The
professional bail bondsman's important and continuing role in the criminal
processes of the demanding state suggests that the argument that he is en-
gaged in "private" as opposed to "state" action exalts form over substance.
27
Particularly in the case when apprehension and return of a fugitive accused
is at issue, the bondsman's role as de facto agent of the demanding state
emerges with clarity; indeed, pursuing bondsmen are often accompanied by
"off-duty" policemen from the demanding jurisdiction.2s The end result of the
bondsman's efforts - exposure of the accused to criminal sanctions in the
demanding jurisdiction - is identical with the goal of extradition proceed-
ings ; bondsmen are privileged to achieve such results by a status created by the
state explicitly to serve such functions. Given the close involvement of private
bondsmen in the effectuation of the demanding state's criminal law adminis-
tration, it is difficult to see how the asylum state's sovereignty is less offended
by the "private" than by the "official" method of removal. Second, although
the extradition laws are intended to preserve interstate harmony,2 9 both by
requiring formal demand and by restricting severely the asylum state's inquiry
upon the tendering of a demand, federal provisions also reflect a major
counterprinciple - the protection of individuals within the asylum jurisdic-
tion from the expense and inconvenience of being transported against their
will to foreign jurisdictions, when the accusation of criminal conduct is patent-
See also Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REv. 493, 507 (1955). Moreover, there are economic obstacles to prosecuting a civil action,
even for defendants who are not convicted. Cf. Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to
Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 352 (1936) (actions against
sureties on official bonds). The equities would seem to run strongly against the bail-jumper
in an action against his bondsman. Cf. Foote, supra at 500.
26. Interviews with bondsmen, and officials.
27. Cf. Note, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 972 (1961).
28. Interviews with bondsmen' and officials. And see Golla v. State, 50 Del. 497, 135
A.2d 137 (1957).
29. See 2 MooRx, ExTRAnmox §§ 521-22, at 826-31 (1891).
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ly frivolous or mistaken.30 Recognition of this policy against interstate trans-
fer on frivolous or malicious grounds was articulated as early as 1793, when
the original federal extradition statute was enacted ;31 courts have also noted
30. The generally protective character of the extradition, requirements is expressed
in United States v. Meyering, 75 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1934), as follows:
The [federal] statute is one involving the substantial rights of citizens, and its
essential elements must be strictly followed. Only by faithfully following the pro-
vision of the statute may a person, be lawfully deprived of his liberty and extradited
from an asylum state to another state, there to be tried for the commission of a
crime. The alleged fugitive has a right not to be imprisoned or dealt with by the
states in disregard of those safeguards provided by the Constitution and statutes
of the United States.
Id. at 717. See Note, Illegal Abductions by State Police: Sanctions for Evasion of Ex-
tradition Statutes, 61 YALE L.J. 445, 448 (1952).
An examination of the federal rule of criminal procedure dealing with the removal of
criminal defendants from one federal district to another for trial in a federal court may
help to illumine certain aspects of the policy underlying extradition laws. Under FED. R.
Cm. Ppoc. 40, the procedure which is followed depends on whether the demand for
removal is based upon an, indictment or upon an information, and complaint. If it is based
upon information and complaint, proof of reasonable cause to believe the defendant guilty
must be adduced. If it is based upon indictment, proof of identity coupled with a certified
copy of the indictment will suffice, as the indictment will be exclusive proof of probable
cause. A similar distinction appears in section 3 of the UNIFORm CRIMINAL EXTRADIION
Act. Alexander Holtzoff, the Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in 1943 when Rule 40 was adopted, explains (3 F.R.D. 445, 451-52)
that the distinction reflects the fact that in the case of an indictment, the grand jury, an
independent body, "which is an arm of the court," has already found probable cause. The
facts found must, nevertheless, constitute an offense under federal law. In the case of a
complaint or information, no such determination has been made and, therefore, separate
proof of reasonable cause is required. In either case, the defendant is entitled to a judicial
hearing in the asylum district. The revisers recognized that
theoretically, it seems anomalous and illogical that although the entire United
States is a single jurisdiction from the standpoint of the Federal Government,
nevertheless, a proceeding akin to extradition, should be required to enable a delivery
of a fugitive from one territorial subdivision to another.
Id. at 450.
But it was felt that,
on the other hand, as a practical matter, in view of the long distances that are at
times involved, some supervision, and restrictions seem desirable on the transpor-
tation of an accused person from one part of the country to another.
Ibid. Thus, extradition-like provisions were retained, in order to protect defendants
against removal on insubstantial grounds, in cases where the distance involved was greater
than 100 miles. Rule 40(a). The point of this reference to the removal rules is that the
advisory committee, Congress and the Supreme Court, faced with the task of codifying
and streamlining the rules which had grown up under the extremely general removal
statute, 18 U.S.C. former § 591, now § 3041, adopted an extradition-type procedure whose
restrictions and hearing privileges can be justified only in terms of a policy of protecting
defendants against improvident transfer. This suggests that similar provisions in, the ex-
tradition laws may be defended on similar grounds, and that their social utility cannot
be expressed solely in terms of the policies of interstate harmony.
31. This statute supplemented U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, by specifying the authority
upon which demand was to be made, the form of the demand and the methods to be used
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the importance of extradition statutes as procedural safeguards of the rights
of the accused.
32
Since the shining knight of "policy" does not avail the bondsman, he may
attempt to justify his technique on mundane practical considerations. What
of the spectre of increased forfeitures? If bail-jumpers could skip the juris-
diction without fear of a pursuing bondsman, the business risk would be in-
creased and the bonding business depressed and discouraged. The argument
assumes that the state would not permit bondsmen to shift the increased risk
of loss to accused seeking to make bail, an assumption perhaps reasonable
in view of the present widespread concern over the inability of many defend-
ants to meet present premium and collateral requirements. 33 Granting the
assumption, it is probable that application of the extradition law to the bonds-
man would not significantly alter his forfeiture rate. Under the extradition
laws as presently administered, extradition is, in percentage terms, only rarely
refused; in instances where the requisition papers are found defective, the
demanding state may, at the habeas corpus hearing, be able successfully to
amend its request by correcting inconsistencies or by furnishing more infor-
mation.34 It seems reasonable to suppose that the ratio of forfeitures arising
from refused extradition to all other forfeitures would be very slight.3 5 Hence,
in recovering the fugitive. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1958). But the necessity for providing
effective machinery was not the only policy consideration deemed important by Congress.
In an opinion which greatly influenced the final form of the statute, Attorney General
Randolph, discussing the constitutional requirement that the person be "charged," deemed
it "sufficiently technical to exclude any wanton or unauthorized accusation from becoming
the basis of the demand." 2 MooR, EXTRADITION § 532, at 842 (1891). Also, proof of
fugitive status was thought necessary, for otherwise, "the most innocent citizen might be
carried in chains from his own state to another." 2 MooRE, EXTRADITION § 532, at 843.
Thus, there seems to have been some consideration of certain procedural risks inherent
in the extradition, provision. This concern was reflected in the formal requirements of the
1793 statute, which, in turn, are carried over into section 3 of the UNIFORM AcT.
32. See, c.g., Henry v. McArthur, 122 Colo. 474, 223 P.2d 621 (1950), where the
court discharged the prisoner on the ground set forth in note 20 supra, and stated:
[T]o allow the removal of a Colorado citizen to another state upon such a showing
would sanction the possibility of designing individuals, in their enmity, to make
false accusations against a person and bring about their wrongful arrest and re-
moval from the state.
122 Colo. at 479, 223 P.2d at 623. See also Ex parte Hart, 63 F. 249, 259 (4th Cir. 1894).
33. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE
ADIINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66-68 (1963); Comment, A Study of
the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 707 (1958) ; Foote,
Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA.
L. REv. 1031, 1032 (1954).
34. See People v. Sai, 24 Ill. 2d 168, 180 N.E.2d 464 (1962) ; Hackler v. Lohman,
17 Ill. 2d 78, 88-89, 160 N.E.2d 792, 799 (1959).
35. Since 1936, there have been approximately 100 reported cases - most of them
unfavorable to bondsmen - dealing with remission of forfeitures. In the great majority
of the cases in which remission was denied, courts emphasized either that the default of
the principal was "willful," or that the police retrieved the fugitive without assistance
from the bondsman, or simply that the appearance of the accused for trial either never
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the increase in the rate of forfeitures would be slight.36
The bondsmen may justifiably complain, however, because a more elaborate
system of extradition would add to the costs he now incurs in ensuring re-
moval through his present, primitive extraterritorial arrest procedure. The
courts of the demanding state, in the exercise of their broad discretion to re-
solve questions relating to the forfeiture of bail bonds in the manner "required
by justice,"37 might impose such additional costs upon the bondsman in one
of three ways. If the bondsman has already paid a forfeiture, and the demand-
ing state makes the initial expenditures necessitated by extradition, the amount
of those expenditures may be deducted from the amount of the forfeiture re-
mitted once the accused has been returned for trial. 38 Or, if the bondsman has
not been required to pay the forfeiture before the time when he surrenders
the accused for extradition, the court in the demanding jurisdiction may re-
quire him to pay a forfeiture - in the nature of a reimbursement - equal to the
expenses incurred by the demanding state in financing the accused's extra-
dition.39 Finally, if the bondsman himself has made out-of-pocket expendi-
tures in order to bring about removal by extradition, the burden would rest
upon him if the courts of the demanding state refused to entertain claims for
reimbursement of the bondsman's expenses. The result of throwing this finan-
cial burden upon the bondsman might be a serious undermining of the bonds-
man's elan as a pursuit agent.40 Yet this burden could readily be avoided
occurred or was delayed beyond a statutory time limit. Remission occasionally has been
denied when the default resulted from the arrest and confinement of the principal in an-
other state for a different offense. Compared, with these causes of forfeitures, refusal to
extradite (under the hypothesized extension of the extradition laws) would be of little
importance.
36. Note, also, that a very small percentage of all principals jump bail. See Foote,
Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1031, 1063 (1954). And in
the event that the authorities in the bail jurisdiction declined to seek extradition of a
defendant located and held by a bondsman in another state, the bondsman might success-
fully recoup a forfeiture under a traditional doctrine that the surety cannot be held liable
where his inability to produce the principal results from the interference by the state in
which bail was given. See In re Beavers, 131 F. 366 (C.C.E.D. N.Y. 1904); Bowling v.
Commonwealth, 123 Va. 340, 96 S.E. 739 (1918).
37. See generally State v. Liakas, 165 Neb. 503, 86 N.W.2d 373 (1957); Annotation,
4 A.L.R.2d 440. See also FED. R. CRIm. P. 46(f) (2); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2937.39
(Supp. 1963).
38. Cf. United States v. Smith, 5 F.R.D. 274 (W.D. Ky.); Weinstein v. United
States, 124 Ct. Cl. 559 (1953) ; Commonwealth v. Yavelberg, 48 Pa. D. & C. 583 (1944).
39. Cf. Allison v. People, 132 Colo. 156, 286 P.2d 1102 (1955) ; State v. Wright, 193
Okla. 383, 143 P.2d 801 (1943).
40. The digests contain a considerable number of cases in which the bondsman had
vigorously pursued the defendant, suggesting that bondsmen remain highly motivated to
avoid or recoup forfeitures by such means. See, e.g., People v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins.
Co., 208 Misc. 504, 144 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1955) ; United States v. Legg, 157 F.2d 990 (4th
Cir. 1948). Interviews with bondsmen reveal that some bondsmen pursue bail-jumpers,
even where adequate security has been given by a third-party indemnitor, in order to
maintain a reputation for relentless pursuit as a general psychological deterrent to flight.
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through an equitable administration of forfeiture policy by the courts of the
demanding state.41 Where the bondsman is successful in reducing the accused
to custody, justice seems to require that forfeitures be remitted in full, with-
out a deduction for extradition expenses incurred by the state, and that no
reimbursement, in the form of a partial forfeiture, be assessed against the
bondsman. On the contrary, the court might be expected to entertain quasi-
contract actions by the bondsman - who after all has placed the defendant
within the state's grasp - against the demanding state for reimbursement of
that part of the bondsman's out-of-pocket costs which is attributable to the
imposition of extradition requirements upon him.
Although opposition to procedural protections for the accused pursued by
his bondsman cannot be sustained on grounds of severe financial impact on
bondsmen, it is nevertheless desirable that additional costs, delays and pro-
cedural complications should not exceed that level which is necessary for the
protection of the accused's rights and the asylum state's interests. Thus it
may be argued that, while extradition protections should be afforded the al-
leged bail-jumper in the asylum state, they should be limited to a hearing on
questions relating to the identity of the accused and the existence of the bail
relationship. Certification by the demanding state of the bond bearing the de-
fendant's signature, and of the fingerprints presumably taken at the time of
original arrest would require no more than a summary hearing, yet insure
against cases of mistaken identity.42 The hearing, however narrow, would
also provide minimum satisfaction of the asylum state's interest in protecting
its sovereignty and discouraging self-help measures which may produce either
breaches of the peace or irremediable injustice. By allowing a bailed accused
some breathing space in which to prepare to challenge, in an orderly, open
court proceeding, the bondsman's right to carry him out of the jurisdiction,
and thus shedding light on bondsman's activities, such a hearing might also
tend to discourage bondsmen from employing brutal methods in the course of
arrest and removal.
4 3
In one city, enjoying a low forfeiture rate, a court clerk suggested that the low rate was
... due, perhaps, to the fact that personal bondsmen in our county are a very
aggressive group and relentlessly pursue the defendant who skips bail on which
they are surety and bring them back in very many instances. We have had examples
where they have gone out of the country in order to effect the production of a
person who had skipped bail. This hard attitude on the part of some of these sure-
ties has put the fear of God into a lot of defendants who know what to expect in
the event that they skip bail; so we do not have any particular problem in this
regard.
Letter from Clerk of District Court, Douglas County, Omaha, Neb., June 24, 1953, quoted
in Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1087 (1954). Professor Foote, however, remains unconvinced of
the efficiency of "private law-enforcement" in this area. Ibid.
41. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
42. Questions of identity have occasionally arisen in ex-tradition, proceedings. See,
e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Dronsfield v. Hohn, 390 Pa. 434, 135 A.2d 757 (1957); Cook
v. Rodgers, 215 Ind. 500, 20 N.E.2d 933 (1939) ; Note, 32 COLUm. L. REv. 1069 (1932).
43. See United States v. Trunko, discussed in note 18 supra.
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Two assumptions underlie a suggestion to supplement current bonds-
men's practices merely by requiring a limited hearing in the asylum state. The
first assumption is that the publicity of a hearing will temper the bondsmen's
conduct. There is some truth to this; the institution of bail is under such
intensive attack 44 that the embattled bondsman will act carefully before sup-
plying more ammunition for his critics. However, to permit bondsmen to
continue to make their own arrests in the asylum jurisdiction is to tempt the
bondsman to violate any post-arrest surrender provisions which might delay
or hinder the bondsman in removing the defendant - now within his actual
physical custody. The temptation would be emphasized if the statute requiring
such a hearing followed the model of the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Act,45 which
imposes analogous requirements on police officers of a foreign jurisdiction
who enter the "asylum" state in hot pursuit of an absconding accused, but
fails to provide any sanction for violation of its requirements. It may be wiser,
therefore, to follow a recent California statute,46 and deprive the bondsman
of his right of arrest in the asylum state by requiring him to apply to a magis-
trate for a warrant directing that the alleged fugitive be arrested by officers
of the asylum jurisdiction and presented before a magistrate to be informed
of his right to counsel. Violation of the statute by a bondsman is a misde-
meanor; even if the more limited approach of a right to a hearing were
adopted, an enforcement provision imposing such a penalty would seem requi-
site.
The second assumption behind the suggestion of a hearing limited to proof
of identity and the existence of the bail relationship is that such a hearing
provides sufficient safeguards. Removal in such cases need not be conditioned
on a finding of fugitive status, or of factual substantiality in the charge against
the accused, it may be thought, because such substantiality and status may be
assumed from the fact that the accused could not have been arrested and
granted bail, without a finding of probable cause by officials of the demand-
ing state.47 But extradition case-law uniformly evidences a feeling that such
an assumption cannot properly be made. Courts have not discriminated against
bail-jumpers or other post-arrest escapees in determining the availability of
extradition safeguards. Indeed, there is some judicial support for the view that
a bail-jumper may seek habeas corpus on the ground that he was not in the
44. See Carbo v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 662 (1962) (Douglas, J., determining
application for bail pending appeal under F. R. Crim. P. 46) ; Pannell v. United States,
320 F.2d 698, 699, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinions of Wright and Bazelon,
JJ.); Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 971 (1961);
REPORT OF THE THIRD FEBRUARY 1954 GRAND JURY OF NEW YORK COUNTY, reprinted in
17 LAW. GUILD REV. 149 (1957). See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S Comx-
MITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE AD1MINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66-67
(1963).
45. See California version, CALIF. PENAL CODE §§ 852-852.4 (1956).
46. CALIF. PENAL CODE 847.5 (1963 Supp.).
47. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1164 (1960).
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demanding state at the time of crime.48 Legislative choices reflected in statu-
tory provisions also call the assumption into question. In its bail extradition
statute, California has rejected the notion that asylum state inquiry into fugi-
tive status is superfluous in the case of the bail-jumper, and requires a show-
ing that the accused was in the demanding state at the time of the alleged
crime and that he is presently sought to answer for it.49 Section 3 of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act expressly requires 'that, in cases where a
defendant has jumped bail pending appeal or commitment after conviction,
the demand must include, besides a copy of the judgment of conviction or
sentence, an allegation that the defendant has broken the terms of his bail to-
gether with a separate allegation that the accused was in the demanding state
at the time of the alleged crime.5° Such a separate allegation would be un-
necessary if the bail relation itself constituted sufficient proof of fugitive
status.
If fugitive status cannot be lightly inferred from the bail relationship, neither
can factual substantiation of the charges brought against the accused. The
normal extradition case would seem to require more of the demanding state
than production of the bail piece. The courts -have indicated, in cases of flight
before arrest, that demanding papers accompanied only by a warrant for the
defendant's arrest, are insufficient to justify rendition, 51 despite the fact that
such a warrant could not have been issued without a finding of probable cause
based on an affidavit of a complaining witness. If such a warrant is insuffi-
cient to justify rendition of an accused who flees before arrest, such a warrant,
standing by itself, must be insufficient to justify rendition of a post-arrest fugi-
tive. It would be curious if the fact of bail-setting was used as a substitute
for factual substantiation in these circumstances. In the case of such a fugitive
who flees before preliminary hearing, there has been no finding of probable
cause supplementing or reviewing the initial determination to issue the war-
rant, even if bail has been granted. Nor can it be presumed, as a general prop-
osition, that post-arrest fugitives have already had a sufficient opportunity to
test the substantiality of the charge while in the demanding jurisdiction, since,
at the police stage of the proceeding, many defendants either cannot afford
counsel or have not been made sufficiently aware of their rights. 2 Thus it
would be unreasonable for courts to hold that defendants who flee after arrest
48. See Kay v. State, 34 Ala. App. 8, 37 So. 2d 525 (1948).
49. See note 46 supra. It is assumed that the term "fugitive" is used in this statute
in the same sense as it is used in the federal and state extradition laws, in which a fugitive
is one who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state, has left its juris-
diction and is found within the territory of another state when it is sought to subject him
to the criminal process of the former state. Ex parte Riccardi, 69 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d
627 (1949).
50. 9 U.L.A. 274 (1957).
51. See Coats v. Sain., 24 Ill. 2d 248, 181 N.E.2d 179 (1962) ; Hanowski v. Sullivan,
41 So. 2d 338 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1949) ; In re Fritz, 137 N.J. Eq. 185, 44 A.2d 414 (1945).
52. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1165 (1960).
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but before preliminary hearing are less entitled than pre-arrest fugitives to a
showing of factual substantiality based on affidavits or indictments included
in the demanding papers.53
It follows that bailed accused, and not merely pre-arrest fugitives, are en-
titled to a full extradition-type hearing, in which the demanding state is
obliged to establish substantiality and fugitive status by affidavits or indict-
ment in support of requisition. Because the bondsman's methods have long
gone unchallenged, such reforms have the appearance of a substantial inno-
vation. The few precedents in this area uniformly hold that the bail piece pro-
vides sufficient authorization for arrest and removal of the defendant from the
jurisdiction by his bondsman. 4 Courts, even if they could require a hearing,
could not effectively require that the bondsman surrender his principal to the
authorities of the demanding state in order that such a hearing might take
place. Nor, for reasons stated above, is the bailed fugitive in a position to
initiate judicial intervention. 5 The problem thus seems one for the legislature.
If the legislative response to the problem is to include suspension of the
bondsman's right of arrest, the California statute 51 might serve as an appro-
priate model. If not, some lesser degree of assurance of a judicial hearing may
yet be afforded by legislation similar to the Uniform Fresh Pursuit Act.5 7 In
either event, the legislation should provide criminal sanctions for violation of
its requirements. In addition to the controls imposed on the bondsman's arrest
activities, the legislature must determine, as a separate issue, the scope of the
hearing to be provided. Although the California statute provides a hearing
which inquires beyond mere questions of identity and proof of the bond rela-
tionship, the issues to be determined do not include that of factual substantia-
tion. Since bail-jumpers have equities - substantially equal to the equities of
other accuseds r18 - in an opportunity to raise this issue while still in the
asylum state, the new legislation should expressly require the issue to be heard.
53. Furthermore, the situation is not much different after the preliminary hearing.
It has been said that,
in practical effect ... the preliminary hearing in the United States does not add
significantly to the police evidentiary screen which has preceded it.
Id. at 1168.
[S]ince defense counsel is usually either not present, or insufficiently informed
to play his role properly, it ordinarily falls to the magistrate, almost alone, to
test the sufficiency of the evidence .... Yet, most magistrates are either unskilled,
or too busy, or too closely linked with police or prosecutor, or insufficiently mind-
ful of the "judicial" nature of their role to perform this function. adequately. And
the sole review of the sufficiency of the evidence before them is the limited one
afforded by habeas corpus which looks only for some "legally competent evidence"
to support the order committing the accused for trial.
Id. at 1167.
54. See note 18 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
56. See note 46 suPra.
57. See note 45 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
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Of course, there remains the possibility that in taking cognizance of the
problems discussed in this Note, a legislature might view the irregularities
and circumventions of extradition laws associated with removal by bondsmen
as a "last straw" justifying a critical reappraisal of all facets of the bondsman's
contributions to criminal administration. For years, the bondsman has been
roundly accused of a wide variety of corrupt practices 51 and criticized on the
ground that a bondsman's refusal to become surety for certain defendants
may operate to overrule a magistrate's determination that the defendant ought
to be released if he is financially able to post bail at a certain amount.60 How-
ever, there is at present no significant movement in the direction of abolish-
ing the criminal bail bond business either by direct or indirect means. Indeed,
any such movement would in some way have to dispose of the not implausible
argument that the bondsman's vigorous pursuit activities effectively supple-
ment police efforts to retrieve fugitives and thus have some social utility worth
preserving.6 ' Throughout the foregoing discussion, the assumption has been
made that the bonding business will continue to flourish as an integral element
of American criminal administration and that the problems raised by the
bondsman's extraterritorial activities will continue to exist until relieved by
legislative action requiring some form of judicial intervention in the asylum
state.
59. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE THIRD FEBRUARY 1954 GRAND JURY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY, reprinted in 17 LAW. GUILD REv. 149 (1957); MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS
48-56 (1930).
60. See, e.g., Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 689, 699, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (con-
curring opinions of Wright and Bazelorr, JJ.) ; Note, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 971 (1961).
61. See note 40 supra.
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